"Grundbegriffe zur Analyse illokutionärer Akte". Linguistische Berichte 183 (2000), 309–323.

In “Illokutionäre Akte und Konventionalität” (2000) I argue that the speech-act models of Searle and Bach & Harnish mistakenly reconstruct Austin’s term “illocutionary act”. The issue of the present article is to provide terms for a more adequate analysis of “illocutionary act” in Austin’s sense. Searle’s concept of “counts-as”-rules contains important relations to Austin’s “conventional consequences”. Bach & Harnish have made explicit that “counts-as”-rules and therefore “conventional facts” are to be explained by something like “mutual belief in a community or group”. The terms “illocutionary convention”, “illocutionary intention” and “conventional fact” are determined based on these thoughts.